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Fidelity, Conscience, and Dissent: Engaging the LCWR and Charles Curran on the Issue of 
Dissent in a Roman Catholic Context 
 
This thesis critically examines the cases of Vatican intervention with the Leadership 
Conference for Women Religious (LCWR) and Charles Curran to explore the question of 
whether legitimate dissent is possible as an act of conscience. The Doctrinal Assessment of the 
Leadership Conference for Women Religious released by the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
Faith, as well as the exchange between Sr. Pat Farrell, then-president of the LCWR, and Bishop 
Blair, the one who conducted the investigation on the LCWR, on “Fresh Air,” a radio show on 
National Public Radio raise questions about how the Church is to understand truth, obedience, 
and conscience. This event also raises questions about why this controversy occurs at this point 
in history. 
 
To critically examine the differing perspectives of dissent and conscience, I analyze the 
case of Charles Curran, a Catholic priest and former professor at Catholic University of America, 
to exlore how dissent might be understood to be an act of a holistic conscience – one that takes 
seriously the subjective/ affective elements of human experience as well as the objective pole of 
morality. By applying the insights of the Curran case analogously to the LCWR case, with the 
help of Robert K. Vischer’s articulation of the relational dimension of conscience, this thesis 
articulates how the Church might understand its role in being a venue for consciences to thrive 
while preserving its claim of authentic teaching authority. 
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Introduction 
 On April 16, 2012, the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith (CDF) released their 
Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious in which it reported 
the findings of the CDF-initiated doctrinal assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women 
Religious (LCWR) that began in 2008. In this assessment, the CDF posits three major areas of 
concern: 1) “Addresses given during LCWR annual Assemblies manifest problematic statements 
and serious theological, even doctrinal errors,” 2) “policies of corporate dissent,” and 3) “a 
prevalence of certain radical feminist themes incompatible with the Catholic faith.”1 As a result, 
the CDF has mandated a series of reviews and reforms under the guidance of Archbishop J. Peter 
Sartain and his assistants, Bishop Thomas Paprocki and Bishop Leonard Blair, in the hope of “a 
renewal of [the LCWR’s] work through a concentrated reflection on the doctrinal foundations of 
that work.”2 Since then the LCWR has attempted to dialogue with the Vatican leadership and the 
appointed delegates while refusing to accept the reforms mandated thus far by the CDF’s 
doctrinal assessment. 
 While these events have occurred relatively recently and may even be argued to be of an 
unprecedented scale, the basic themes that rest at the foundation of these events are by no means 
novel. These events throw into relief foundational questions of fidelity, dissent and conscience in 
the Roman Catholic Church. What is fidelity? Is dissent a morally authentic form of prophetic 
witness? Is dissent even possible? What authority does the Magisterium carry in exercising to 
moral truths? What role does conscience play in fidelity and/ or dissent? It is my hope that by 
                                                 
1 “Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious.” Congregation for 
the Doctrine of Faith (CDF), April 16, 2012. 
2 “Statement of Cardinal William Levada, Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith, on the Doctrinal Assessment of the LCWR.” Cardinal William Levada, April 16, 2012. 
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analyzing the current events involving the LCWR in light of recent developments in the realm of 
moral theology, specifically the case of Charles Curran, I might provide new insights into 1) why 
dissent is a moral issue and not just a matter of ecclesial authority and 2) when dissent functions 
as not just a morally viable option but also a faithful act of good conscience. I approach these 
questions by applying the insights from the Curran case towards the LCWR’s response to the 
Vatican. These questions, while not new, are important to be asked in every generation as 
tradition in every age struggles to come to terms with the reality in which it lives. I argue that 
taking seriously the implications of modernity’s turn to the subject requires the Church and the 
faithful to acknowledge the possibility of dissent as a moral act of conscience. This 
acknowledgement, in turn, calls for an open dialogue on the way which objective truths and 
subjectivity coincide within the human person’s life narrative. 
Voices to be Considered – Curran and Sr. Pat Farrell 
 The primary voices around which this thesis is centered are those of Charles Curran and 
Sr. Pat Farrell, OSF, the president of the LCWR. Through these two figures, I engage the 
question of conscience in the hope of moving beyond an over-simplification of such cases that 
reduces the complexity of conscience-based tensions into a contest with only one winner and one 
loser. By analogously applying the thoughts of Robert K. Vischer on the relational dimension of 
conscience, I hope to move beyond a simplistic dichotomy and think critically about conscience 
as being at the center of a moral relationship between the two. 3  Lastly, Sr. Pat Farrell’s 
                                                 
3 Vischer, Robert. Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space Between Person 
and State. (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010). 
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presidential address to the LCWR during their annual assembly on August 10, 2012 will provide 
a moral framework through which the insights of Charles Curran can be applied today.4 
 Charles Curran is a central figure because his narrative is a similar and relatively current 
case of dissent in the Church today. Curran had been deemed ineligible to be a professor of 
Catholic theology by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1986, headed at the time 
by Cardinal Josef Ratzinger (now Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI). This culminated after years of 
clashing with church authorities over issues like contraception, homosexuality, divorce, abortion, 
and the Church hierarchy’s role in moral matters. As such, Curran has distinguished himself as 
one of the most prominent and controversial Roman Catholic moral theologians in the United 
States. What is most intriguing about his story is that despite the actions taken against him, 
Curran remains a committed Catholic priest who continues to work for authentic reform in the 
same Church that censured him. His narrative, and not so much the substance of his dissent on 
the various moral issues, will be one of the primary foci of this thesis as it provides insight into 
the moral possibilities of dissent itself. 
 Sr. Pat Farrell, OSF, is the former-president of the LCWR who delivered her last address 
to the LCWR at their annual assembly in August of 2012. In her address, titled “Navigating the 
Shifts,” she directly responds to the CDF’s doctrinal assessment of the LCWR and lays out a 
general framework for the organization’s actions moving forward. The tenets of her speech 
provides a framework for a contemporary moral understanding of dissent as dialogue and 
prophetic witness. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Farrell, Pat. (2012, August). “Navigating the Shifts.” Presidential Address at the 2012 
Assembly of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious. St. Louis, Missouri. 
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Method 
 While a historical approach to the development of moral theology might provide a deeper 
understanding of the depth with which dissent has marked and shaped the Church5, I also use the 
case of Charles Curran’s clash with the Vatican in order to provide a theological analysis on the 
ethics of dissent so as to shed light on the LCWR’s current situation. By identifying common 
themes between both the LCWR and the Curran cases, I argue that a contemporary 
understanding of conscience requires the acknowledgment of the moral legitimacy of dissent as a 
dialogical praxis. 
 The first question to be considered is how one might move beyond the usual discussions 
of conscience without slipping into the oversimplified dualism of Church hierarchy versus the 
consciences of the faithful (i.e. reducing conscience to authority). While the two elements do 
need to be seriously considered, it is possible to negotiate the tension between the two without 
vilifying one or the other. A rethinking of conscience by reflecting on its relational dimension 
provides new fertile ground for fruitful discussion on the role of the Magisterium and the 
consciences of the faithful in terms of relationality and mutual accountability. This is an attempt 
to move the discussion away from simply an ecclesiological question which lends itself to 
hierarchical functionality and authority towards an ethical discussion of right relationship with an 
anthropological starting point that might transform the ecclesial makeup of a contemporary 
Church. While the question of hierarchical authority will be engaged, this thesis will not be a full 
systematic analysis of ecclesial authority as the primary focus is on dissent as an act of holistic 
conscience. 
                                                 
5 Charles Curran’s book, Catholic Moral Theology in the United States: A History, traces the development of moral 
theology in the United States in the past two centuries. This includes a various array of interconnected subjects such 
as the Second Vatican Council and its effects on fundamental moral theology, bioethics, sexual ethics, and social 
ethics in the United States. 
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  Secondly, one must consider the connotations of the terms “fidelity” and “dissent” so as 
to move past the polarizing connotations they carry. While “fidelity” is traditionally understood 
to mean loyalty to the orthodoxy of the faith tradition, “dissent” is traditionally understood to 
mean the public and scandalous turning away from the orthodoxy of faith tradition. However, 
once the questions are asked – To whom or what is one’s fidelity towards? To whom or what is 
one dissenting against? – then the terms come to find more nuanced meanings and the 
complexities of dissent and fidelity are unpacked. Ultimately, these terms can grow and develop 
to be more similar than they are different. By reflecting on these terms in the context of a holistic 
conscience, fidelity and dissent are not competing attributes but could act as catalysts for 
rethinking how one engages in a moral relationship with the Magisterium. 
 The last question to be considered is how this ethical framework for dissent might play 
out in reality. An analogical analysis of Charles Curran’s case with the LCWR’s case may very 
well provide insight into how, as Sr. Pat Farrell put it, the LCWR can “navigate the shifts” 
moving forward. While there will not be a perfect symmetry between Curran’s dissent and the 
LCWR’s clash with the Vatican (i.e.- corporate versus individual dissent), their common themes 
indicate the importance of conscience and its relationship with authority on the discernment of 
truth in a post-Vatican II world. 
Navigating a New Way Forward 
Through carefully discerning these questions, this thesis does not hope to encapsulate all 
the answers possible but rather seeks to open new avenues for discussion on the ethical 
implication of dissent in the Church. Both the LCWR and Curran cases illustrate how instances 
of controversy over dissent in the Church are not problems to be solved but are opportunities for 
dialogue on moral issues that contain potential for new insights for the Church. In the narrowest 
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sense, I seek to provide a renewed sense of hope in support of the LCWR as well as a renewed 
sense of fidelity to the Roman Catholic Church as it continually negotiates its place in a 
pluralistic moral landscape. By reframing the discussion of conscience not in the terms of static 
and individualized functionality, but rather as a relationally binding and complex element of self-
transcendence of the human person, dissent might be understood as fidelity to good conscience. 
Thus, the actions of the LCWR and Charles Curran can be understood as exercises of their 
consciences in the hopes of charitable dialogue with the bishops. 
 Understanding that this thesis may very well have a modest effect, if at all, on the current 
situation regarding the LCWR, it is my deepest intention that this inquiry into the moral 
dimension of dissent provides yet another perspective on this difficult question. By starting with 
an empirical and anthropological perspective, as much of contemporary theology has already 
done, it would be significant to reflect on how the Magisterium might respond more fully with 
the same starting point in this new century. For the Church to meaningfully address 
contemporary moral matters it must address the current existence of a pluralism of consciences. 
In this regard, an anthropological starting point that gives weight to human experiences while 
addressing questions of fidelity and dissent might be a gateway for new possibilities for a new 
millennium. It is my hope to contribute to this theological endeavor in light of current events and 
in service of the common good of the people of God. 
The Road Map 
 Moving forward this thesis addresses the relational approach to conscience, fidelity and 
dissent as dialogue, and an ethic of dissent incrementally. 
 Chapter one, “A Zero-Sum Game? - The LCWR and the Vatican,” addresses the 
movement beyond vilifying either the Magisterium or the dissenters by throwing into relief the 
 
7 
deeper questions that arise out of the LCWR case. Much of this controversy has played out in the 
media, and I will analyze two interviews done on National Public Radio (NPR) with Sr. Pat 
Farrell and Bishop Blair to draw out the perspectives from which the LCWR and the Vatican 
draw their conclusions. 
 Chapter two, “Curran, Dissent, and the Holistic Conscience” examines the Curran 
controversy to draw renewed insight into the LCWR case for the third chapter. This chapter not 
only focuses on how Curran came to be in conflict with the Vatican, but I also draw upon 
Curran’s conception of a holistic conscience where the subjective and the objective meet in the 
human person. Curran’s approach to conscience is important to understand the framework with 
which Curran justifies his dissent yet still considers himself a faithful Catholic. 
 Chapter three, “Responsible Dissent in a Roman Catholic Context,” applies the insights 
from chapters one and two in an analysis of Sr. Pat Farrell’s address to the LCWR and their 
actions since. By articulating the context in which dissent creates a charitable – but not 
necessarily painless – dialogue in good conscience between the Magisterium and the faithful, I 
introduce Vischer’s articulation of a relational conscience as the key to understanding a practical 
framework for responsible dissent. By taking seriously the implications of modernity’s turn to 
the subject, Vischer’s approach to conscience as an act of a person’s life narrative implicates the 
Church with the responsibility to dialogue with dissenters with a hermeneutic of charity and not 
suspicion. 
 In the conclusion, I note that while this is not a systematic analysis on a new theory of 
conscience, it is a foundation for understanding the role of dissent in a Roman Catholic context 
as an act of conscience. In the service of the common good, the Church and the People of God 
have the responsibility towards each other to dialogue with openness and charity over the 
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conscientious issues that affect the heart of who human persons are and what the Church as the 
People of God is. 
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Chapter One: A Zero-Sum Game? - The LCWR and the Vatican 
 Much of the LCWR controversy has taken place through the media and its various 
outlets. Before theological reflection on the controversy can begin, a contextual understanding of 
the way in which the LCWR controversy is presented to the public provides, in itself, a good 
starting point for inquiry. A critical understanding how each interested party, the LCWR and the 
Vatican, arrived at their particular views provides a unique insight into the possibility of a new 
moral understanding of dissent and an opportunity for a new ecclesial framework. While it might 
be profitable for the media and intriguing for public scrutiny, a zero-sum game approach to the 
LCWR controversy wherein either the LCWR or the Vatican must “lose” in order for the other to 
“win” does not contribute to the mission and Spirit of the Church. However, when one 
understands the different starting points from which the LCWR and the Vatican perceive, 
interpret, and act upon the present controversy, then an opportunity for moral dialogue and 
ecclesial maturity presents itself in the life of the Church raising questions about theology and 
public debate. 
Sr. Pat Farrell’s Response to the Vatican’s Assessment 
 As stated in the introduction, the CDF indicated three major areas of concern of what it 
perceives to be indicative of the LCWR’s erroneous ways in need of guidance and reform: 1) 
theological and doctrinal errors within LCWR’s annual assemblies, 2) policies of corporate 
dissent, and 3) “a prevalence of certain radical feminist themes incompatible with the Catholic 
faith.”6 Examining Sr. Pat Farrell’s responses to the CDF’s charges provides insight into the 
LCWR’s point of departure with the Vatican. 
 
                                                 
6 “Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious.” Congregation for 
the Doctrine of Faith (CDF), April 16, 2012, II - The Doctrinal Assessment. 
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Addresses given during annual LCWR general assemblies 
 Regarding the annual addresses given at LCWR general assemblies, the doctrinal 
assessment cites Bishop Leonard Blair’s example of an instance where Sr. Laurie Brink spoke of 
“some Religious ‘moving beyond the Church’ or even beyond Jesus.’”7 The CDF interprets this 
as: 
[a] challenge not only to core Catholic beliefs; such a rejection of faith is also a serious 
source of scandal and is incompatible with religious life […] Some might see in Sr. 
Brink’s analysis a phenomenological snapshot of religious life today. But Pastors of the 
Church should also see in it a cry for help.8 
 
 By using language such as “challenge”, “rejection of faith”, “serious source of scandal”, and 
“cry for help”, the CDF’s Doctrinal Assessment seems to frame the LCWR’s actions as moving 
from challenge to rejection and ultimately distress. 
 It is important to note that in Sr. Pat Farrell’s interview with Terry Gross on “Fresh Air,” 
a program broadcast on National Public Radio, she articulates the situation very differently. In 
regard to the specific quote of Sr. Laurie Brink, Farrell states: 
it’s quoted very much out of context from the presentation that was given, and in the 
context the person giving that was talking about how do we deal with conflicts within the 
church, with differences that we have with hierarchy. […] And so she outlined several 
scenarios of possible ways to respond. And one of them was, well, we could move 
beyond Jesus, we could move beyond the church. 
 
However, Farrell also went on to note that Sr. Laurie Brink’s “preferred approach would be that 
we continually seek dialogue and reconciliation with the hierarchy.”9 
 Just by looking at the first point of concern one can already spot the differing 
perspectives of the LCWR and the Vatican are viewing the present situation. The Vatican 
                                                 
7 Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, II - The Doctrinal 
Assessment. 
8 Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, II - The Doctrinal 
Assessment. 
9 Farrell, Pat. “An American Nun Responds to Vatican Criticism.” Fresh Air. Interview by Terry 
Gross. NPR, July 17, 2012. Web.  
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appears to be viewing the LCWR with a hermeneutic of suspicion while the LCWR feels that it 
is merely providing an analysis of a present reality while still being faithful its core doctrines. 
Policies of Corporate Dissent 
The Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious states: 
  
Leadership Teams of various Congregations, among them LCWR Officers, protesting the 
Vatican’s actions regarding the question of women’s ordination and of a correct pastoral 
approach to ministry to homosexual persons (e.g., letters about New Ways Ministry’s 
conferences). The terms of the letters suggest that these sisters collectively take a position 
not in agreement with the Church’s teaching on human sexuality. It is a serious matter 
when these Leadership Teams are not providing effective leadership and example to their 
communities, but place themselves outside the Church’s teaching.10 
 
In response to this allegation, Sr. Pat Farrell claims that an important distinction to make is that 
“individual congregations or leadership teams may have taken certain positions; the Leadership 
Conference of Women Religious has not.”11 Farrell distances the possible culpability of the 
LCWR from the letters being referred to because those letters come from “Leadership Teams” 
and not on behalf of the LCWR as an institution. For Farrell, the actions of the Leadership 
Teams – protesting the Vatican – do not speak to the integrity, intent, or actions taken by the 
LCWR. At best, the CDF assessment was able only to link the two by interpreting the letters as 
mere suggestion about “these sisters” (not necessarily the whole body of the LCWR as it remains 
vague as to what the CDF means be “these sisters”), that they collectively take a position 
opposite the Church.12 
Despite distancing the LCWR from possible culpability, Farrell goes on to state: 
 [The LCWR has] been, in good faith, raising concerns about some of the church’s 
teaching on sexuality, human sexuality, the problem being that the teaching and 
interpretation of the faith can’t remain static and really needs to be reformulated, 
                                                 
10 Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, II - The Doctrinal 
Assessment. 
11 Farrell, Pat. “An American Nun Responds to Vatican Criticism.” 
12 Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, II - The Doctrinal 
Assessment. 
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rethought, in the light of the world we live in and new questions, new realities as they 
arise. And if those issues become points of conflict, it’s because women religious stand in 
very close proximity to people at the margins, to people with very painful, difficult 
situations in their lives. That is our gift to the church.13 
 
Again, Farrell defends the LCWR’s positions as being that of an inquiry and moral conviction 
shared by many in the Church. This inquiry and moral conviction is rooted in the reality that 
“people at the margins” live in and need a presentation of faith that is “less black and white 
because human realities are much less black and white.”14 In this way, Sr. Pat Farrell is calling 
for an understanding of living tradition that the Vatican has yet to embrace. 
Radical Feminism 
 The last area of concern in the doctrinal assessment is 
[the] prevalence of certain radical feminist themes incompatible with the Catholic faith in 
some of the programs and presentations sponsored by the LCWR, including theological 
interpretations that risk distorting faith in Jesus and his loving Father who sent his Son 
for the salvation of the world. Moreover, some commentaries on “patriarchy” distort the 
way in which Jesus has structured sacramental life in the Church; others even undermine 
the revealed doctrines of the Holy Trinity, the divinity of Christ, and the inspiration of 
Sacred Scripture.15 
 
Related, but not necessarily explicitly linked, to this Doctrinal Assessment of the LCWR are two 
instances of hierarchical intervention involving two feminist theologians in the United States: Sr. 
Elizabeth Johnson, C.S.J. and Sr. Margaret Farley, R.S.M. In March of 2011, Sr. Elizabeth 
Johnson, C.S.J. had her book, Quest for the Living God, critiqued by the Committee on Doctrine 
by the  United States Conference of Catholic Bishops for not being in “accord with authentic 
Catholic teaching on essential points”16 as a result of her feminist method. In June, after the CDF 
Doctrinal Assessment of the LCWR was released, the CDF also released a statement that 
                                                 
13 Farrell, Pat. “An American Nun Responds to Vatican Criticism.” 
14 Farrell, Pat. “An American Nun Responds to Vatican Criticism.” 
15 Doctrinal Assessment of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, II - The Doctrinal 
Assessment. 
16 Statement on Quest for the Living God: Mapping Frontiers in the Theology of God, by Sister 
Elizabeth A. Johnson, Conclusion.  
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denounced the book, Just Love, by Sr. Margaret Farley, R.S.M., for not being in accord with 
Catholic teaching as well.  
 In response to this criticism of the LCWR, Farrell gives her own observation that there is 
a “fear of women’s position in the church.”17 She claims that what the CDF is referring to as 
“radical feminism” is really an authentic attempt by Catholic women theologians to look 
seriously look at “the question of how have the church’s interpretations of how we talk about 
God, about how we interpret Scripture, about how we organize or life in the church, how have 
those formulations been tainted by a culture, a religious culture, a secular culture, that minimizes 
the value and the place of women?”18 For the CDF to call that “radical feminism” is, according 
to Farrell, “a polarizing way of talking about it, which sounds a little fear-based.”19 Again, there 
exists a present tension between a grassroots approach that starts from personal experience and a 
top-down approach to doctrinal matters. This tension is a symptom of deeper theological 
differences that reflect the plurality of intra-institutional theologies within the Roman Catholic 
Church. These differences are manifest in the differing approaches to moral questions of 
decisionality as it relates to the moral agent’s individual personhood in relationship to the world 
around him or her. In the LCWR’s instance, the sisters seem to be concerned with re-articulating 
women’s place in the present world in light of developing feminist theologies. Meanwhile, the 
CDF is concerned with the possibility of the LCWR communicating what the CDF deems to be 
erroneous theology, despite the good intentions of the LCWR’s pastoral approaches, as women 
religious in the Roman Catholic Church.  
 
                                                 
17 Farrell, Pat. “An American Nun Responds to Vatican Criticism.” 
18 Farrell, Pat. “An American Nun Responds to Vatican Criticism.” 
19 Farrell, Pat. “An American Nun Responds to Vatican Criticism.” 
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Bishop Blair’s Response and the Vatican’s Point of Departure 
 A week after Sr. Pat Farrell shared her thoughts about the LCWR controversy on “Fresh 
Air,” Bishop Leonard Blair – the one who was conducted the doctrinal assessment of the LCWR 
– was the guest on Terry Gross’ show and shared his perspective on the matter. It is clear the 
Bishop Blair’s understanding of the controversy is a manifestation of the Vatican’s position on 
three major questions: 1) What is truth?  2) What is obedience? And 3) What is their relationship 
in a human persons moral agency? This comes to light when Blair responds to Gross when asked 
about whether or not the assessment really indicated a spirit of conformity rather than dialogue. 
Bishop Blair responded by saying: 
we have to give a nuance about dialogue because if by dialogue they mean that the 
doctrines of the church are negotiable, and that the bishops represent one position and the 
LCWR presents another position, and somehow we find a middle ground about basic 
church teaching on faith and morals, then no. […] the fundamental faith of the Catholic 
Church is that there are objective truths; and there are teachings of the faith that really do 
come from revelation, and that are interpreted authentically through the teaching office of 
the church, by the guidance of the Holy Spirit; and that are expected to be believed with 
the obedience of faith. And those things are not negotiable.20 
 
In this statement, Bishop Blair communicates clearly how he understands truth and obedience. 
What is Truth? 
 When Bishop Blair speaks of “objective truths” and “revelation” he indicates a deep 
tradition of Roman Catholic thinking found in various Church documents. For instance, in 
Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II asserts: 
“within Tradition, the authentic interpretation of the Lord’s law develops, with the help 
of the Holy Spirit. […] Nevertheless, it can only confirm the permanent validity of 
Revelation and follow in the line of the interpretation given to it by the great tradition of 
the Church’s teaching and life, as witness by the teaching of the Fathers, the lives of the 
Saints, the Church’s Liturgy and the teaching of the Magisterium.”21  
 
                                                 
20 Blair, Leonard. Farrell, “Bishop Explains Vatican’s Criticism of U.S. Nuns.” Fresh Air. 
Interview by Terry Gross. NPR, July 25, 2012. Web. 
21 Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II. (1993), 27. 
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By building upon the Second Vatican Council’s works, Pope John Paul II admits that the “Lord’s 
law develops” as human history advances and new realities come to light. However, the way in 
which the Lord’s law develops is of importance. By preserving the line of interpretation to the 
Church’s teaching, the witness of the Fathers, the lives of the Saints, the Church’s liturgy and the 
teaching of the Magisterium, Pope John Paul II makes exclusive the role of developing the 
interpretation of the Lord’s Law to the Magisterium – the teaching office of the Roman Curia 
and the bishops.  
 This understanding of how the Lord’s law develops would even address the way in which 
the Vatican finds “radical feminism” troubling and incompatible with the Roman Catholic faith 
because it understands itself to be the sole valid and authentic interpreters of the Lord’s law. In 
regards to the role of theologians, Cardinal Josef Ratzinger states: 
This service to the ecclesial community brings the theologian and the Magisterium into a 
reciprocal relationship. […] Theology, for its part, gains, by way of reflection, an ever 
deeper understanding of the Word of God found in the Scripture and handed on faithfully 
by the Church's living Tradition under the guidance of the Magisterium. Theology strives 
to clarify the teaching of Revelation with regard to reason and gives it finally an organic 
and systematic form.22  
 
Thus, the Vatican takes the stance that even the overwhelming series of new theological 
movements (e.g. – feminist theology, liberation theology, historical-critical methodology, etc.) 
based upon the ever-changing realities of the faithful are subject to the interpretation of the 
Magisterium for authenticity. Given the Vatican’s tradition of understanding the domain of truth 
as a received gift given to the Church by Jesus Christ, Blair considers these truths to be “non-
negotiable.” 
What is obedience? 
 In her interview, Sr. Pat Farrell states her understanding of obedience:  
                                                 
22 Donum Veritatis: On the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian. Congregation of the Doctrine 
of Faith. (May 24, 1990), 21. 
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[listening] to what God is calling us to in the signs of our times. We listen to the voice of 
God in legitimate church authority, in the pain and the hopes and the aspirations of the 
people of our time. We listen to the voice of God in the depths of our own hearts, and in 
our consciences; and that all of that together is what we listen to in trying to discern, what 
is God really calling me to? And it’s to that, that I must be obedient.23  
 
This obedience that Sr. Pat Farrell speaks of could be understood to mean obedience to one’s 
own conscience while also listening to “legitimate church authority.” This inclusive vision of 
obedience does not necessarily disregard or openly reject the Vatican’s authority to teach 
doctrine. Instead, her vision is inclusive of the imminent and personal voice of God that speaks 
to people in their consciences. However, Bishop Blair understands obedience much more 
narrowly. 
 In response to Sr. Pat’s definition of obedience, Blair states: 
it sounds very beautiful and appealing. And no one can argue that we have to be obedient 
to God, and that we have to follow conscience. But on the other hand, it flies in the face 
of 2,000 years of the notion of religious life; that obedience means obedience to lawful 
superiors within the community, and it certainly means the obedience of faith to what the 
church believes and teaches.24 
 
 This tension indicates that there is a different understanding between the Vatican and the LCWR 
of how the Church is fundamentally ordered. It seems that Sr. Pat Farrell’s model orders the 
domain of truth to be interpreted and discerned somewhat equally through the elements of 
legitimate Church authority, personal experience, conscience, and direct interpretation of God’s 
will. However, the Vatican’s position as articulated by Blair is that “the church is a communion 
of faith, and it’s part of our belief that it is hierarchically ordered”25 with the Magisterium as 
having the primacy in terms of authentic authority on truth. As such, that authority must be 
obeyed and its teachings must be believed if one is to be considered a loyal and faithful Catholic 
– especially in the religious life. 
                                                 
23 Farrell, Pat. “An American Nun Responds to Vatican Criticism.” 
24 Blair, Leonard. Farrell, “Bishop Explains Vatican’s Criticism of U.S. Nuns.” 
25 Blair, Leonard. Farrell, “Bishop Explains Vatican’s Criticism of U.S. Nuns.” 
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Moving Beyond the Zero-Sum Game 
 In light of this framework it is easy to categorize the tension between the LCWR and the 
Vatican as that of inductive theology versus deductive theology, feminist versus patriarchal, 
liberal versus conservative, communal versus monarchical, and many other dichotomies. 
However, there is also another possibility when one frames the situation as an opportunity for a 
Church-wide examination of conscience and fidelity to truth. In the former framework, there 
exists a zero-sum game wherein there must be an obvious “loser” for the “winner” to be 
considered righteous or winning out. However, such a model runs contrary to the Church’s own 
teaching when it says: 
Church, which the Spirit guides in way of all truth and which He unified in communion 
and in works of ministry, He both equips and directs with hierarchical and charismatic 
gifts and adorns with His fruits. By the power of the Gospel He makes the Church keep 
the freshness of youth. Uninterruptedly He renews it and leads it to perfect union with its 
Spouse. The Spirit and the Bride both say to Jesus, the Lord, ‘Come!’26  
 
To discern that there is possibly an intra-Church loser is to deny the Church’s fundamental belief 
that both gifts and charisms are given to all of the Church. Thus, an appropriate way forward is 
to discern how the controversy itself is an intra-Church dialogue on truth, revelation, conscience 
and obedience - even if its own elements are currently in disagreement. By reflecting upon and 
respecting the starting points of both the LCWR and the Vatican, there exists the possibility of a 
transformative dialogue that might not only provide a moral understanding to the question of 
dissent, but also be an element of a new ecclesial framework.  
 If the discussion on the LCWR is to move beyond dichotomies, then the third question 
must be raised: What is the relationship between truth and obedience in a person’s moral 
agency? It is in this question that both Farrell and the Bishops might find a fruitful starting point 
to being a dialogue over conscience and its role in discerning how truth and obedience might 
                                                 
26 Lumen Gentium, 4. 
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direct a person’s actions. While the Vatican approaches the topic of conscience as being 
submissive and referential to the objective truth as it is interpreted by the Magisterium, the 
LCWR has a more inclusive vision for the discernment over moral issues wherein the teachings 
of the Magisterium are brought into dialectical play with individual conscience as it is informed 
by human experience. The implications of the LCWR’s vision might seem threatening to the 
Vatican because such a dialectic would inevitably result in shifts in the teaching tradition of the 
Church and grant greater authority to individual consciences on moral matters. However, the 
LCWR’s vision is one that is shared by many within the Church, especially in the wake of the 
Second Vatican Council. While tensions and dissent are not new phenomena in the Church, they 
do manifest in a particular way within the LCWR case precisely because of the Church’s on-
going process of discerning how to implement the Council’s proclamation: 
the Church has always had the duty of scrutinizing the signs of the times and of 
interpreting them in the light of the Gospel. Thus, in language intelligible to each 
generation, she can respond to the perennial questions which men ask about this present 
life and the life to come, and about the relationship of the one to the other. We must 
therefore recognize and understand the world in which we live, its explanations, its 
longings, and its often dramatic characteristics.27 
 
For the LCWR, their situation arises out of the complex question that Richard Gaillardetz 
identifies in his book, When the Magisterium Intervenes: The Magisterium and Theologians in 
Today’s Church: “How does a congregation of women religious discern the signs of the times 
and not disturb the status quo in society and the Church?”28 The reality is that the LCWR cannot 
avoid disturbing the status quo and the next chapter teases out the lessons from the Charles 
Curran controversy to address how a contemporary reading of the signs of the times can justify 
dissent as a moral act of personal conscience. 
                                                 
27 Gaudium et Spes, 4. 
28 Gaillardetz, Richard. When the Magisterium Intervenes: The Magisterium and Theologians in 
Today’s Church. (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2012), 69. 
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Chapter Two: Curran, Dissent, and the Holistic Conscience 
 While the case of the LCWR is perhaps the latest case of public dissent and Vatican 
intervention, it is hardly the first case of public dissent in the history of the Catholic Church. 
Charles Curran’s conflict with the Vatican in the 1980’s provides an insightful example of what 
public dissent in the modern era looks like and the possible merits of it as a moral action. Again, 
there is a tendency is to view this issue as a conflict between the Church hierarchy and an 
individual Catholic, however, Curran’s dialogue with then-Cardinal Ratzinger, prefect for the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith at the time, illustrates something different – a dialogue on 
what exactly the relationship is between conscience, Church teaching, and fidelity. 
 The style and content of Curran’s dissent gives a particular illustration as to what areas of 
doctrine he deems to be acceptable for dissent and how precisely dissent should be employed. 
His deference to personal conscience as the authorizing element for his dissent as well as his 
methodology of dissent point towards a style of dissent which is more concerned with engaging 
the Church in dialogue than just being a self-interested, scandal-inducing dissenter as a less 
critical observer might perceive. 
 The letters between Curran and Ratzinger reveal a dispute over the understanding of 
conscience, the Church’s teaching authority and the context wherein one who considers himself 
faithful could publicly dissent from Roman Catholic teaching. Although the Church does not 
agree with him, I argue that Curran’s insights in particular opens the possibility for a new moral 
framework that allows for dissent as an act of conscience in accord with core Roman Catholic 
teaching and its understanding of living tradition. The very fact that the Church does not 
recognize Curran’s position and refuses to maintain active dialogue on the matter is the reason 
why Curran’s approach is exceptionally practical for those who find themselves at unable to 
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assent to Magisterial teachings. In the same respect, those who assent to the Church’s teaching 
might, in the service of ecclesial unity, adopt the Church’s recommendation to dissenters: to 
remain open and maintain a spirit of discernment over the questions raised. Ultimately, Curran’s 
approach to conscience and dissent is an answer to the question that arises when a faithful 
Christian cannot assent to the Magisterium: How can dissenters respond to a Church that either 
refuses, or lacks the capacity, to dialogue with them? Curran’s response provides the foundation 
for a new framework that is drawn out in the next chapter which is developed particularly from 
the works of Robert Vischer in light of the documents of the Church documents, especially 
Lumen Gentium, Veritatis Splendor and Donum Veritatis. 
Curran’s Dissent 
 Charles Curran was born into a Catholic family in Rochester, New York in 1934. By the 
age of thirteen he had discerned that he was called to be a Catholic priest. Curran studied at the 
North American College in Rome and took classes at the Jesuit Gregorian University, where he 
was schooled in theology under the likes of Bernard Häring and Josef Fuchs, SJ. He continued 
onto his doctoral studies and was ordained a diocesan priest. 
 In 1965, Curran gave a paper calling for the renewal of moral theology at the Theological 
Institute of the National Liturgical Conference. This paper called for a renewal in four areas of 
moral theology: 1) a more biblical approach centered around Jesus’ teachings from the Sermon 
on the Mount; 2) an emphasis on liturgy as a great “source and school for Christian morality” 
wherein “Christians become conscious of who they are and what they are called to be in their 
lives;” 29  3) a greater focus on how Christians should live their vocation to holiness and 
perfection in all aspects of their daily life, and 4) the recognition that “human nature is more 
                                                 
29 Curran, Charles. Catholic Moral Theology in the United States: A History. (Georgetown 
University Press: Washington, D.C., 2008), 96. 
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personal, more historical, and more relational than manualistic natural law theory allows.”30 
These four areas of renewal which Curran calls for would be the foundation for what the Vatican 
would later deem dissent on Curran’s part. In a series of publications, Curran argued for change 
in the approach to natural law and Church teaching on issues such as sterilization, divorce, 
masturbation, homosexuality, and justifying dissent itself from noninfallible moral teachings.31 
As a result, in April, 1967, the Catholic University of America decided not to renew Curran’s 
teaching contract because of his stances; however, a strike on behalf of Curran led by the faculty 
and students of CUA resulted in the trustees reinstating and promoting Curran. In 1968, Curran 
was the face of a statement signed by over six hundred Catholic academics that disagreed with 
the condemnation of artificial contraception in Pope Paul VI’s encyclical, Humanae vitae.32 As 
Curran became more prolific, the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith launched a seven-year 
investigation which, in July, 1986, declared Curran to be neither “considered suitable nor eligible 
to exercise the function of a Professor of Catholic Theology.”33 
Letters Between Curran and Cardinal Ratzinger 
The Vatican’s disciplinary action against Curran took part in two steps: first, a letter from 
Cardinal Ratzinger asking Curran to retract the positions he takes in opposition to Church 
teachings and second, a letter which deemed Curran unsuitable to teach Catholic theology almost 
a year later. In the first letter, Cardinal Ratzinger both identifies the areas of Curran’s dissent and 
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33 Ratzinger, Joseph. “Letter to Father Charles Curran.” Congregation for the Propagation of 
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gives a response which is indicative of the Church’s stance on dissent in the Roman Catholic 
ecclesial context. 
Cardinal Ratzinger claims:  
Catholic theologians […] do not teach on their own authority but by virtue of the mission 
they have received from the Church. In order to guarantee this teaching, the Church 
claims the freedom to maintain her own academic institutions in which her doctrine is 
reflected upon, taught and interpreted in complete fidelity. This freedom of the Church to 
teach her doctrine is in full accord with the students’ corresponding right to know what 
that teaching is and have it properly explained to them. This freedom of the Church 
likewise implies the right to choose for her theological faculties those and only those 
professors who, in complete intellectual honesty and integrity, recognize themselves to be 
capable of meeting these requirements.34  
 
Through this logic, Ratzinger establishes the framework which he believes authorizes him to 
discipline Curran as defending the freedom of the institution of the Roman Catholic Church to 
communicate authentically its identity as understood in the Vatican’s teachings. It follows that if 
the Church maintains its freedom to teach its doctrine, then the Church also maintains its right to 
choose only those who can communicate the Church’s teaching with “intellectual honesty and 
integrity.” Thus, Ratzinger authorizes this disciplinary action against Curran as an exercise of 
institutional freedom of conscience – that is, authentically communicating the very identity of the 
Church in the Church’s academic institutions. 
Secondly, Cardinal Ratzinger identifies three areas of dissent from the Church’s 
teachings on: 1) on the principle of the Church’s teaching on contraception, 2) abortion/ 
euthanasia, and 3) masturbation, pre-marital intercourse and homosexual acts. After explaining 
briefly the Church’s justification for its teachings, Ratzinger states that “all the faithful are bound 
to follow the Magisterium according to which these acts are intrinsically immoral.”35 Not only 
                                                 
34 Ratzinger, Joseph. “Letter to Father Charles Curran.” Congregation for the Propagation of 
Faith – September 17, 1985. Moral Theology No. 6: Dissent in the Church. (ed. By Charles 
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35 Ratzinger. “Letter to Father Charles Curran.” September 17, 1985, 359. 
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does Ratzinger claim the authority of the “living tradition of the Church, made evident in the 
teaching of recent Popes, [and] the documents of the Vatican Council II,” but he binds all the 
“faithful” to the Magisterium’s moral teachings found in this “living tradition.” 36 While this 
letter is primarily directed towards Curran, it is also meant to be an aggregate statement to all the 
faithful who might wish to dissent with the Church’s teachings. Ratzinger closed his letter with 
an appeal for Curran to retract his positions on these teachings in order for Curran to continue 
teaching as a Catholic theologian – a request which Curran refused to accommodate. 
Curran replied to Cardinal Ratzinger with a proposed compromise because he remained 
“convinced of the truthfulness of [his] positions at the present time.”37 Ratzinger flatly declined 
this compromise and declared Curran ineligible to teach Catholic theology. In his final letter to 
Curran, Ratzinger addresses one last concern of his – one which Curran brought up regarding the 
teaching authority of the church and “responsible dissent.”38 Curran had claimed that since his 
dissenting positions “diverge only from the ‘non-infallible’ teaching of the Church, they 
constitute ‘responsible’ dissent and should therefore be allowed by the Church.”39 In response to 
this, Ratzinger claims that  
one must remember the teaching of the Second Vatican Council which clearly does not 
confine the infallible Magisterium purely to matters of faith nor to solemn definitions. 
[…] Besides this, the Church does not build its life upon its infallible magisterium alone 
but on the teaching of its authentic, ordinary magisterium as well. […] In any case, the 
faithful must accept not only the infallible magisterium. They are to give the religious 
submission of intellect and will to the teaching which the Supreme Pontiff or the college 
of bishops enuntiate on faith or morals when they exercise the authentic magisterium, 
even if they do not intend to proclaim it with a definitive act.40 
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The letters from Cardinal Ratzinger suggest two main areas for analysis in the Curran 
case on the topic of dissent: conscience and the teaching authority of the Magisterium. In 
Ratzinger’s arguments, it is clear that he takes the traditional stance of defending the 
Magisterium’s ultimate authority on doctrinal and moral matters – an authority that resides in 
both the infallible teachings of the Church and in the living Tradition of the Church as embodied 
by the College of Bishops.  It is from this authority that Ratzinger calls for all the faithful to bind 
their intellect and will to the Magisterium and its teachings. However, through critically 
examining the relational dimension of conscience through the work of Robert Vischer and the 
evolution of the Church’s self-understanding as seen in the documents of the Second Vatican 
Council, I argue in the next chapter that the relational dimension of conscience calls for an 
inversion of Ratzinger’s framework. This argument follows that the faithful are not bound to 
submit their intellect and will to the narrowly defined living Tradition of the Church as 
understood by Ratzinger, but rather, the teaching authority of the Magisterium is called to serve 
and dialogue with the relationally connected consciences of the People of God as the Church 
continues to strive towards the perfection it will not attain until “there will come the time of the 
restoration of all things. At that time the human race as well as the entire world, which is 
intimately related to man and attains to its ends through him, will be perfectly reestablished in 
Christ.”41 But first, it will be useful to identify Curran’s position on the issues of conscience and 
magisterial authority as it pertains to dissent. 
Curran’s Holistic Understanding of Conscience 
In response to Cardinal Ratzinger’s letter in which the CDF officially declared Curran 
ineligible to teach Catholic theology, Curran wrote back the following:  
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I have always developed my moral theology in the light of accepted Catholic principles. 
My positions on the particular issues involved are always carefully nuanced an often in 
fundamental agreement with the existing hierarchical teaching. Yes, occasionally I have 
dissented from the official teaching on some aspects of specific issues, but this is within a 
more general and prevailing context of assent.42  
 
By placing his act of dissent within the larger context of assent to core teaching, Curran explains 
his dissent as a form of authentic fidelity. Through understanding Curran’s holistic approach to 
conscience with a “relationality-responsibility model” that “sees this call to holiness in light of 
the multiple relationships in which we live – with God, our neighbor, the world, and 
ourselves,” 43 we can understand how his dissent is actually an exercise of Curran’s holistic 
conscience which remains open and disposed to the Word of God. 
Curran’s approach to understanding conscience as the coming together of the subject pole 
and the object pole of morality is comprised of four major aspects: reason, grace, emotions and 
intuitions.44 While Curran notes that the Catholic moral tradition in both the Thomistic and 
manualist traditions understands the objective reality of acts to embrace the moral object, the 
end, and the circumstances, he also recognizes that the “affective aspects and the emotions are 
important parts of Christian and human existence and also play a significant role in the judgment 
of conscience.”45 These affective aspects are the four mentioned earlier and are shaped by the 
“community relationships [that] affect the person as subject.”46 This signals that while Curran 
acknowledges that there is an objective moral truth to be discerned with conscience, there is also 
the subjective element that must be seriously considered as the Church embraces modernity’s 
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turn to the subject. Each of the four aspects reflects the implications of acknowledging this turn 
to the subject. 
The first two aspects, reason and grace, are employed by conscience in at least three 
different ways: a discursive deductive way, a connatural way, and a discerning and prudential 
way.47 The common factor in each of the three methods is the mediation of reason and grace. 
Simultaneously, as the discourse between grace and reason is mediated in the person, Curran 
acknowledges “the role of the Holy Spirit in guiding Christian choices. Liturgical and private 
prayer are ways to ask the Holy Spirit to enlighten our hearts and minds.”48 Thus, spirituality has 
a very important part in the mediation of grace and reason as well. 
The third and fourth elements of Curran’s holistic understanding of conscience are 
emotions and intuition. The emotions that are usually associated with human experiences are not 
impurities that are to be sifted out in the discernment of conscience, but rather Curran 
“recognizes the affective dimension and opposes any simplistic reduction of conscience only to 
the cognitive.” 49  Human aversion to visual depictions of grotesque violence, the appeal of 
dramatic narratives, and sentimental movements to beautiful art are all examples of affective 
responses of the human person to his/ her experiences which shape his/ her existence. Lastly, 
intuition is understood as the “dimension of the person and even a part of the mind that is 
unavailable to our reflect consciousness.” 50  Almost analogous to John Henry Cardinal 
Newman’s illative sense, intuition is that feeling or hunch that is often difficult to articulate or 
rationalize. Curran states that “intuitions can come from many different sources, including grace, 
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human nature, and our affective selves.”51 Nonetheless, these hunches often bear great weight in 
the discernment of conscience and cannot be strictly translated into cognitive terms. 
With this holistic understanding of conscience, one can surmise how Curran dissents with 
Catholic teaching on several issues as the human dimensions of each issue are infinitely varied. 
The balance between the subjective and objective poles of moral discernment that Curran seeks 
is the ground on which Curran justifies his own dissent against the Magisterium. While he does 
not explicitly frame his controversy with the Vatican as such, I argue that the tension between 
Curran and the Magisterium is a result of the affective and subjective elements of human 
experience meeting the objective pole of the Magisterium’s proclaimed doctrines and tradition. 
Should the Church develop a holistic conscience as one Body, then the Magisterium has the 
relational responsibility to discern openly the affective elements of the faithful’s lived 
experiences and the faithful have the relational responsibility of being the agents of mediation 
where reason, grace, emotions and intuition are guided by the Holy Spirit in discourse with the 
objective pole of the Magisterium. 
By seriously considering Curran’s holistic approach to conscience, the way one might 
understand the objective moral order shifts such that intrinsic moral values traditionally assigned 
to moral actions them are either brought into question or subject to greater nuance. Chapter three 
deals with this implication as Robert Vischer provides the key for applying Curran’s insights in a 
Roman Catholic context. 
Curran on Dissent in the Church 
 As far as dissent itself, Curran lists three sets of justifications for dissent and also cites 
three norms of licit dissent noted by the United States’ Bishops laid out in their 1968 pastoral 
                                                 
51 Curran. “Conscience in the Light of the Catholic Moral Tradition,” 17. 
 
28 
letter, Human Life in Our Day. It is in the context of these justifications and norms of licit dissent 
that Curran understands his own case of dissent as an act that remains faithful to the Roman 
Catholic Church and its living tradition. 
 The three sets of reasons for justifying dissent that Curran describes are historical 
reasons, ecclesiological reasons, and reasons from moral theology. The historical reasons pertain 
to the Second Vatican Council’s teaching on the “religious obsequium of intellect and will, 
which is owed to authoritative noninfallible teaching.” 52  On this matter, Curran states that 
obsequium was originally limited to describing the response to definitive Church teaching of 
revelation, but has been expanded to issues that are not definitive nor based on revelation.53 
Thus, obsequium is meant to be understood as granting a presumption in favor of the Church’s 
teaching and calling for an honest attempt to assent to the proposed teaching. However, should 
the honest attempt result in the inability of the individual to assent, then Curran argues for the 
possible legitimacy of dissent from noninfallible teaching.  
Secondly, the ecclesiological reasons for justifying dissent rests mainly in the 
“recognition that the teaching function of the Church is broader than the hierarchical teaching 
function. The primary teacher in the Church is the Holy Spirit.”54 This ecclesiological reason 
points to the notion of the sensum fidelium in Catholic theology. Curran argues that an 
“ecclesiology of communion now recognizes the important role of reception of Church teaching 
by the whole Church. Such communion ecclesiology sees a two-way street between the 
hierarchical teaching office and all the people of God.”55  
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Lastly, Curran appeals to the very nature of moral theology to justify the possibility of 
dissent. He states that in moral theology, “the greater the specificity and complexity, the less 
certitude one can have about a specific norm. […] Conflict situations, by their very nature, are 
very complex, and it is hard to imagine that one proposed solution can claim absolute 
certitude.”56 Therefore, as moral issues become more complex and specific, Curran argues that a 
blanket approach to all doctrinal and moral matters becomes less legitimate. This is because in 
Catholic moral theology there is a notion of an “intrinsic morality – something is commanded 
because it is good. The will of the legislator or teacher does not make something good. Rather 
the teacher or legislator has to conform to the good as discovered through human reason.”57 
Through the holistic model of conscience and the incorporation of its affective aspects, Curran 
believes that one can dissent from noninfallible teachings if one discovers “the good” in a 
specific situation outside the bounds of a blanket moral teaching of the Church. 
 In regards to public dissent, Curran cited the letter from the U.S. Bishops in 1968 that  
explicitly stated: 
the expression of theological dissent from the magisterium is in order only if the reasons 
are serious and well-founded, if the manner of the dissent does not question or impugn 
the teaching authority of the Church and is such as not to give scandal.58  
 
It is Curran’s belief that his public dissent in response to the encyclical, Humanae Vitae, fits that 
description aptly. Should these conditions given by the US Bishops be met, Curran lists the many 
forms of public dissent an individual theologian can take: writing in a theological journal, 
publications, being quoted in the media, etc. Organized public dissent involving groups of 
theologians, such as the case of Curran’s letter which garnered over six-hundred signatures, is 
also a valid form of dissent according to Curran. 
                                                 
56 Curran, Catholic Moral Theology in the United States, 116. 
57 Curran, Catholic Moral Theology in the United States, 116. 
58 United States Bishops Conference. Human Life in Our Day. November 15, 1968, 51. 
 
30 
Conclusion 
 By looking at the Curran case and understanding the theological foundations with which 
Curran understands conscience and dissent, one can see how Curran views dissent as a positive 
force in the Church and a valid exercise of a holistic conscience. While he understands the 
Vatican’s formal denunciation of his specific case of dissent, Curran argues that his dissent is 
theologically grounded in the living tradition of the Church, especially in the Church’s 
acceptance of modernity’s turn to the subject. He believes that if the Church is to take the 
subjective approach to theological anthropology, then it must move away from a strictly 
objective approach to moral theology and take into account the affective aspects of the subjective 
pole. Nevertheless, should the Church not make that move, Curran asserts the legitimacy of 
dissent for those who cannot honestly and authentically assent to noninfallible Church teachings. 
It is precisely these insights that can shed light unto today’s current tension between the LCWR 
and the Vatican so as to not repeat the painful circumstances of Curran’s case, but rather bring 
the Church into a more full communion with respect for the subjective pole of the faithful’s 
consciences.  
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Chapter Three: Responsible Dissent in a Roman Catholic Context 
 In the first chapter, I explored the issues being raised by the current controversy between 
the LCWR and the Vatican. A look at the current dispute raised questions about how to approach 
a conflict between the hierarchy of the Church and its members. Too often these situations are 
viewed with a binary lens with a clear person who is right and another who is wrong. However, I 
called for a new understanding that moves past that and reaches for a more constructive approach 
to the issue of dissent. 
 In the second chapter, I deconstructed the case of Charles Curran, a Catholic priest who 
was deemed unfit by the Vatican to teach Catholic theology because of his dissenting views of 
several moral issues. Curran, however, refuses to stop teaching theology: he teaches at a 
Methodist university, but still considers himself to be a faithful Catholic. He believes that his 
dissent is justified and will one day be redeemed as an act which improved the Church’s 
understanding of moral theology. 
 By bringing the insights from the Curran case into the present issue with the LCWR, a 
renewed understanding of dissent can be developed which assists not just the LCWR as 
dissenters, but also helps the Church as it strives to overcome the tension between defending its 
doctrinal integrity and maintaining a sense of communion with those on the margins of the 
Church’s moral scope. The key to such a synthesis is the relational dimension of conscience as 
articulated by Robert Vischer in his book, Conscience and the Common Good. Understood in the 
context of a post-Vatican II ecclesiology, Vischer’s work sheds new light on how understanding 
the relational dimension of conscience can allow for a plurality of consciences without falling 
into the pitfalls of a zero-sum game which determines one conscience to be correct and the other 
invalid. 
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Common Themes: The LCWR and Curran 
 Before addressing Vischer’s approach to conscience, it is worth noting the common 
themes between the LCWR case and Curran’s case. Given the analyses of the previous two 
chapters, there are five common elements between the LCWR and Curran cases: 1) the dispute 
occurs over divergent perspectives on the moral landscape as a result of differing approaches to 
deep theological questions, 2) the dissenting parties appeal to the weight of human experience, 3) 
rather than rupture their relationship with the hierarchical Church, the dissenting parties consider 
themselves faithful Catholics, and 4) as faithful Catholics, the dissenting parties call for an open 
dialogue with the hopes of a renewed understanding of the disputed moral issue(s). 
Morality on the Margins 
 The first commonality between the LCWR and the Curran cases deal with the nature of 
dissent. Both the LCWR and Curran understand their conflicts as being clashes over differences 
with the hierarchical Church over systematic understanding of Catholic teaching that manifests 
itself in instances of moral crises. Often times these crises are unique cases outside of the norm 
of Catholic doctrinal teachings. For instance, Farrell’s statement that “women religious stand in 
very close proximity to people at the margins, to people with very painful, difficult situations in 
their lives”59 as the justification for the LCWR calling for “the teaching and interpretation of the 
faith […] to be reformulated, rethought, in the light of the world we live in and new questions, 
new realities as they arise”60 is an indicator of the weight with which the LCWR measures the 
element of human experience in moral decision-making. Their dispute does not seem to be an 
attempt to completely deconstruct dogmatic claims which remain at the core of Catholic 
teaching, but rather the LCWR finds room for renewed understanding of deep theological 
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questions in light of contemporary human experience. This attempt at renewal places the LCWR 
at odds with the Vatican over how to approach the moral dilemmas that the faithful often find 
themselves in. While the hierarchical Church tends to lean towards a deontological method of 
moral decision-making,61 the LCWR and Curran tend towards a responsibility model wherein 
“[m]oral persons are seen as ones who are acted upon and then must respond in accordance with 
their interpretation of what is happening to them. In this model, the right thing to do is properly 
harmonious with the full relational context.”62  
 Given this understanding of the conflict, Curran articulates what he calls a “relationality-
responsibility model” that approaches the “call to holiness in light of the multiple relationships in 
which we live – with god, our neighbor, the world, and ourselves.”63 By explicitly linking the 
role of relationships in a moral agent’s life with his/ her responsibility as a moral agent, a 
connection between a moral agent’s circumstances with his/ her moral responsibility in any 
given situation is more clearly demarcated in the relationality-responsibility model than the 
deontological approach of the Roman Catholic Church to moral matters. This becomes especially 
explicit in instances of developing moral ambiguities such as homosexuality and contraception as 
the sciences continue to gather ever-more current anthropological data. As such, both Curran and 
the LCWR are both pushing the Roman Catholic Church to acknowledge the individual 
uniqueness of varied moral crises which opens up the possibility for varied moral responses to 
these situations. 
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The Affective Element of Conscience 
 Both Curran and the LCWR believe themselves to agree on the foundational dogmatic 
truths upon which the Roman Catholic Church is founded upon, and they view their dispute as 
not being over what is understood to be the objective good, but rather the disagreement is over 
the subjective pole (to use Curran’s terms) which functions as the differing variable in moral 
assessments. Curran discussed this dimension of the holistic conscience as he emphasized 
emotions and intuition as being as important to the discerning conscience as reason and grace. In 
the same manner, the LCWR claims a unique insight into moral matters because of the women 
religious’ “close proximity to people at the margins, to people with very painful, difficult 
situations in their lives.”64 Sr. Pat Farrell does not deem this to be coincidental, but rather, she 
claims that this unique proximity to these people is the women religious’ “gift to the church.”65 
By particularly highlight the “painful, difficult” elements of the marginalized peoples’ situations, 
she especially appeals to what Curran calls the affective elements of a holistic conscience.  
It is important to note that both the LCWR’s proximity to those on the margins and 
Curran’s articulation of a holistic conscience are placed within a larger historical and theological 
context in the Catholic Church. The Vatican II document, Gaudium et Spes, calls for the Church 
to read the signs of the times and “recognize and understand the world in which we live, its 
explanations, its longings, and its often dramatic characteristics.”66 This call from the Second 
Vatican Council, combined with the Church’s breadth of Catholic Social Teaching and Pope 
Paul VI’s decree, Perfectae Caritatis, calling for the adaptation and renewal of religious life, has 
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led the LCWR to understand their mission to be present among, and view with charity, the 
marginalized wherever they may be. Pope Paul VI stated: 
Institutes should see to it that their members have a proper understanding of people, of 
the contemporary situation and of the needs of the church, this to the end that, evaluating 
the contemporary world wisely in the light of faith, and fired with apostolic zeal, they 
may be more helpful to people.67 
 
Since the Second Vatican Council, the hierarchy and several intra-Church faithful have found 
themselves at odds over what this call to read the signs of the times means for moral praxis and 
ecclesial authority. 
Dissent as Fidelity 
 What is interesting about both the LCWR and Curran cases is that while the Church has 
very strictly criticized the perspectives and approaches which constitute the dissenting parties’ 
self-understanding, the dissenters still claim to be loyal Catholics carrying out their Christian 
calling. The fact that Sr. Pat Farrell indicates her dissent as a form of obedience to both “the 
voice of God in legitimate church authority” as well as obedience to “the voice of God in the 
depths of our own hearts, and in our consciences”68 signals that this perceived dissent is actually 
a form of fidelity. This echoes Curran’s understanding of his own dissent as being “within a 
more general and prevailing context of assent.”69 It is important to note that neither dissenting 
party is seeking to appeal to an authority around the hierarchical Church but rather they are 
appealing to a higher authority both within and through the Church. 
 Placing this understanding of dissent as fidelity in context is important because Pope 
John Paul II states: 
Dissent, in the form of carefully orchestrated protests and polemics carried on in the 
media, is opposed to ecclesial communion and to a correct understanding of the 
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hierarchical constitution of the People of God. Opposition to the teaching of the Church’s 
Pastors cannot be seen as a legitimate expression either of Christian freedom or of the 
diversity of the Spirit’s gifts. When this happens, the Church’s Pastors have the duty to 
act in conformity with their apostolic mission, insisting that the right of the faithful to 
receive Catholic doctrine in its purity and integrity must always be respected.70  
 
This means that there remains a fundamental difference in the ecclesial understanding between 
the Vatican and the dissenters that needs to be reconciled. The Vatican illustrates dissent to be 
disruptive to the ecclesial communion of the Church while the dissenters view their actions as 
necessary for the renewal and strengthening of ecclesial subsidiarity and solidarity within the 
Church. Thus, the dissenters call for a venue for dialogue. 
Call for Dialogue 
 Both cases of Curran and the LCWR indicate that since they are appealing to fidelity 
towards a higher authority, God, both within and through the Church, then the ultimate goal is to 
renew or reform the Church while keeping intact the foundational dogmas it is founded upon. 
Both the LCWR and Curran have called for an ecclesial apparatus for dissenters to attempt such 
a transformation through open and honest dialogue. Curran specifically cited “the need for just 
structures to deal with the inevitable tensions that from time to time will exist between 
theologians and pastors”71 and his message is echoed almost three decades later as Sr. Pat Farrell 
proclaims that the LCWR’s “preferred approach would be that we continually seek dialogue and 
reconciliation with the hierarchy.”72 However, it seems that in both cases the attempt at dialogue 
is always preempted with an air of suspicion as it only occurs as a result of an “investigation” 
from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Such circumstances inhibit such an open 
and honest level of communication due to the power differential in the hierarchical relationship 
as well as the hermeneutic of suspicion with which the hierarchy begins any dialogue on such 
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matters. The Church’s position is not surprising given Pope John Paul II’s statement on dissent 
quoted above. In its hierarchy of priorities, the Church takes the stance that the “right of the 
people to receive Catholic doctrine in its purity and integrity” trumps any claim of legitimate 
dissent as an expression either of Christian freedom or diversity of the Spirit’s gifts. 73 The 
Church understands this responsibility to be its primary concern as stated in Lumen Gentium: 
And this infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed 
in defining doctrine of faith and morals, extends as far as the deposit of Revelation 
extends, which must be religiously guarded and faithfully expounded. […]To these 
definitions the assent of the Church can never be wanting, on account of the activity of 
that same Holy Spirit, by which the whole flock of Christ is preserved and progresses in 
unity of faith […]The Roman Pontiff and the bishops, in view of their office and the 
importance of the matter, by fitting means diligently strive to inquire properly into that 
revelation and to give apt expression to its contents; but a new public revelation they do 
not accept as pertaining to the divine deposit of faith.74 
 
According to the Church, the Magisterium still bears the responsibility to properly inquire into 
revelation and “give apt expression to its contents,” but it does not allow for new public 
revelation to be accepted as the divine deposit of faith since the Church has already received the 
fullness of God’s revelation. Thus, even the diversity of the Spirit’s gifts cannot provide new 
revelation but only contribute to giving “apt expression” to the revelation the Church has already 
received. This distinction excludes the possibility of dissent that, from the Church’s perspective, 
ruptures or refutes revelation as interpreted by the Magisterium, the guardian of revelation by 
Christ’s will.  
Given the four common elements, the two prevailing themes of these elements are: 1) the 
relationship of truth and subjectivity in a moral agent’s conscience and 2) the role of the 
Magisterium in mediating and engaging the plurality of consciences as the teaching office of a 
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pilgrim Church. It is within the context of these two themes that Vischer provides profound 
insight. 
The Relational Dimension of Conscience 
 Robert Vischer – the Dean of the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis 
who explores the intersection of law, religion, and public policy – attempts to dissect the legal 
understandings of conscience in the United States and their practical implications. In his 
analysis, he is careful to avoid an over-individualization of conscience as well as a radically 
communitarian approach to conscience which conflates uniformity with community. Vischer 
intimately links conscience with a person’s very being by stating that a “fully integrated life is 
not possible unless the dictates of conscience are reflected in action.”75 As such, conscience is 
understood to be the mode through which a person’s very being is expressed and actualized in a 
self-transcending action. However, it is not merely an individualized expression since 
“conscience embodies our social nature […] Because conscience is rooted in sources external to 
the person, the dictates of conscience call the person outside of herself even while providing a 
moral center for her own deeply personal values and priorities.”76 Therefore, for the hierarchical 
Church to demand full assent of its members and require dissenters to conform blindly to 
Catholic teaching, the Church is not just requesting obedience but rather demanding a denial of a 
person’s integral development in the exercise conscience. It also elevates a person’s relationship 
with a hierarchical order above what might be more proximate relationships central to the 
person’s very existence (sibling, lover, parent, etc.) and even the person’s direct relationship with 
God. 
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Another important aspect of Vischer’s understanding of conscience is that it is not a static 
and internally isolated moral compass that solely dictates objective moral truths. Vischer argues 
that conscience “is a never-ending dialogue with the will, and conscience’s dictates are in play 
before, during, and after the moment of choice.”77 This organic understanding of conscience is 
important for understanding Curran’s contention that the convergence of the subjective and 
objective poles within conscience can result in different moral responses. Out of this organic 
model of conscience, and building off of Stanley Hauerwas’ portrayal of “moral truth as a story 
to live out,” Vischer claims that “we cannot separate our moral convictions from who we are, 
and we cannot separate who we are from our story.”78 However, if one’s moral life is played out 
as a narrative, then one must acknowledge that one’s moral life is intrinsically relational because 
“life narratives, no matter how unique, rarely unfold in isolation.”79 Therefore, as the Catholic 
comes to actualize his or her life narrative as a Roman Catholic, then he or she cannot deny the 
relational impact that the Church has had on his or her conscience. Consequently, this self-
transcendence requires a dialogical relationship between the Church and the Catholic that grows 
in the process of discerning moral truths and ethical decision-making. This dialogue inevitably 
makes dissent an essential part of that organic relationship as the dictates of one’s conscience 
enters a constant state of play during the development of one’s life narrative. 
 While the Church acknowledges the judgment of conscience to be an “interior dialogue 
of man with himself,” it also states that it is also a “dialogue of man with God” about what the 
objective moral obligation is in a particular instance.80 In regards to this dialogical discernment, 
Pope John Paul II states that “in the case of the correct conscience, it is a question of the 
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objective truth received by man; in the case of the erroneous conscience, it is a question of what 
man, mistakenly, subjectively considers to be true.”81 Obviously, the Church places great weight 
upon the moral objectivity of a given act. However, how does one determine what that moral 
objectivity is? Pope John Paul II claims that “Christians have a great help for the formation of 
conscience in the Church and her Magisterium.”82 He claims that the “authority of the Church 
[to teach the truth by the will of Christ], when she pronounces on moral questions, in no way 
undermines the freedom of conscience of Christians” because freedom of conscience is “always 
and only freedom ‘in’ the truth.”83 By claiming the Church to be the teacher of the truth and 
defining the parameters for the freedom of conscience as residing only within the truth, Pope 
John Paul II creates a de facto model wherein to form properly one’s conscience in freedom, then 
the Christian must do so in and through the Church. In this manner, Pope John Paul II claims that 
the “Church puts herself always and only at the service of conscience, helping it to avoid being 
tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine proposed by human deceit.”84  
 However, the problem with this absolutist argument arises when one seriously considers 
the Church’s self-understanding in Lumen Gentium when the Council affirms the Church’s 
pilgrim status which “will attain its full perfection only in the glory of heaven.”85 Therefore, as a 
pilgrim Church, the Magisterium cannot uphold with certitude a completely static moral order 
that “transcends all particular narratives,”86 as Vischer would put it. In light of its perpetual 
imperfection, the Church would do well to heed Vischer’s call to “acknowledge the diversity of 
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moral truths without precluding the very possibility that moral truth can be discerned”87 and not 
merely “received” as Pope John Paul II claims it to be.  
The narrative of the pilgrim Church’s eschatological journey inevitably interacts and 
dialogues with the individual narratives of the people of God so intimately that Vischer can 
claim “the process of discernment is necessarily a context-specific one.” 88  This validates 
Curran’s holistic approach to conscience which does not undermine the objective pole of moral 
truth but takes into serious consideration the affective/ subjective pole of human experience as it 
unfolds in a person’s life narrative. This also validates the LCWR’s understanding of its unique 
position on the margins with people experiencing painful, difficult situations as its gift to the 
Church because it brings to light the unacknowledged narratives of Christians who have been 
living in the periphery of objective morality. In this light, dissent is not an immoral or unfaithful 
objection to a static moral truth, but it is a conscientious act of a discerning Christian hoping to 
dialogue with a pilgrim Church as it continues to strive towards perfection. The question remains 
then: if the Church is not to dictate “correct consciences” based solely on objective moral truths, 
then how can the Church be at the service of conscience? 
The Church’s Role in the Service of Conscience 
 In Vischer’s legal analysis, he claims that the best role the state can take on in order to 
allow for what he calls a “moral marketplace” to thrive for the common good is four-fold: 1) 
“state actors must appreciate that the human person is inherently social,” 2) “in light of the 
‘bottom up’ nature of moral discourse underlying the common good, the state must permit 
individuals and the groups to which they belong broad discretion to pursue moral identities that 
are not favored by the majority or contemplated by the premises of liberalism. The marketplace 
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of moral claims is essential to the common good,” 3) the state’s commitment to equality need not 
preclude the partiality that invariably arises in meaningful human relationships […] the state 
should focus its equality initiatives on ensuring access to goods and services,” and 4) “embracing 
moral pluralism does not preclude the building of social consensus on issues of common 
importance.”89 This model of state intervention can analogously inform the way in which the 
Church might understand its role in serving the consciences of the faithful. 
 There are, indeed, some limitations on applying Vischer’s approach of creating a moral 
marketplace onto the Church. First, Vischer’s state-as-market-actor approach relies on a 
presumption “about the dynamic and chronically incomplete character of understanding and the 
value of intellectual contest and innovation.” 90  For the Church to claim a “chronically 
incomplete character of understanding” would be counter to its conviction that it contains the 
fullness of the deposit of revelation. Taken to an extreme, this presumption compromises the 
moral authority of the Church as an institution the objective nature of the moral order becomes 
unreliable for discernment. Secondly, transposing Vischer’s model for the state onto the Church 
is problematized when Vischer claims the following about the state:  
this intermediate space [between the individual and the state] is where the moral 
marketplace does its work, and much of that work is aimed at constructing bulwarks 
against the encroachments of the state. That this work may not result in a broader 
discernment of truth is immaterial because the state’s elevation of a single contested 
conception of individual autonomy also has little relation to truth.91 
 
Be describing the moral marketplace’s lack of a broader discernment of truth as immaterial not 
only runs contrary to the Church’s service of conscience but also defeats the purpose of the 
dissenters’ call for dialogue. An ecclesial moral marketplace does call for a broader discernment 
of truth so that the Church might more aptly express the revelation it has received according to 
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the signs of the times. Regulating these weaknesses of transposing Vischer’s state-as-market-
actor approach would mean making the primary goal of the Church/state analogy the goal 
Vischer states in his engagement on conscience and associations: 
The association must be ensured access to the public forum on an equal basis with other 
speakers; the dissenting individual must be assured that the access is not exclusive to any 
particular association; and the state must be permitted to identify and maintain the crucial 
distinction between access and promotion.”92 
 
By maintaining the distinction between access and promotion, the Church gives the flexibility for 
dissenters, and associations like the LCWR, to have access to formal discourse without 
necessarily promoting their views as official doctrinal teaching. This allows for the Church to 
still claim its teaching authority while creating the space for dissenters to dialogue in a moral 
marketplace and maintaining the ecclesial unity Pope John Paul II deemed in jeopardy with the 
presence of dissent. 
While understanding that the Magisterium has a special interest in preserving the 
authentic teaching of the faith, it also bears the responsibility of serving authentically the holistic 
consciences of the people of God. Acknowledging both the relational dimension of conscience 
and the validity of the subjective pole in conscience formation would accomplish the first two 
elements respectively. In regards to the third aspect, engaging in dialogue with dissenters does 
not preclude the Church from exercising its teaching authority but prudential restraint on the part 
of the Magisterium would accomplish much towards ensuring an environment of open and 
honest dialogue. Giving theologians the space of academic freedom, as Curran encouraged, 
would help to accomplish this goal of guiding a fruitful discussion without being overly 
repressive of progressive thought. Lastly, acknowledging that the relational dimension of 
conscience does not reduce the judgment of conscience to “moral relativism” as the Church has 
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long feared is the first step towards a communitarian approach to conscience mediation between 
the Church and the faithful. 
 Taking the step beyond fear of “moral relativism” is one which the Church has yet to 
take. The combination of consolidating authentic interpretation with the Magisterium alone and 
the strictly deontological approach to the development of conscience does not allow for, and is in 
denial of, the current reality of Catholics in the present time. While a manualistic approach may 
have served the faithful during the classical era, it does little to serve the consciences of those 
whose life narratives are also being shaped by developments in anthropological understandings 
of the post-modern era. Thus, an acknowledgment of a “moral marketplace” in a Roman Catholic 
context might best be understood as taking seriously the notion of sensus fidelium wherein the 
Holy Spirit is believed to distribute “his gifts to everyone according as He wills, He distributes 
special graces among the faithful of every rank. By these gifts He makes them fit and ready to 
undertake the various tasks and offices which contribute toward the renewal and building up of 
the Church.”93 By sustaining an arena for open dialogue, the Church allows for the gifts allotted 
to all the faithful to be expressed as the testimony of their life narratives while bearing the fruit 
of a moral marketplace. Vischer claims that “the moral marketplace serves a ‘checking’ function 
on state efforts to instill conformity in matters governed by contested moral norms.”94 Thus, an 
ecclesial apparatus that allows for dissent and academic freedom would be this “checking 
function” within the hierarchical Church and a venue for a dialogical convergence of a plurality 
of consciences among the people of God. 
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A Moral Framework for Dissent in the Roman Catholic Church 
 Vischer’s ultimate claim is that respect for the relational dimension of conscience and a 
thriving moral marketplace are necessary for the “common good.” In order to understand how 
dissent as an act of conscience can contribute to this good, it is important to clarify how the 
“common good” is understood in the Roman Catholic ecclesial context. Pope John Paul II clearly 
addresses what the Church understands to be the common good when he states “to ask about the 
good, in fact, ultimately means to turn towards God, the fullness of goodness […] God, who 
alone is goodness, fullness of life, the final end of human activity, and perfect happiness.”95 In 
light of this definition, the question becomes: How can dissent be a catalyst for turning towards 
God? 
The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith makes its position very clear in its letter 
on the ecclesial vocation of theologians, Donum Veritatis, that dissent is a problem and cannot be 
justified by an appeal to conscience because “setting up a supreme magisterium of conscience in 
opposition to the magisterium of the Church means adopting a principle of free examination 
incompatible with the economy of Revelation and its transmission in the Church.”96 The problem 
with this articulation is two-fold. First, it disregards the relational dimension of conscience by 
making the theologian’s relationship with the Magisterium the supreme relationship with 
primacy over more proximate relationships to the person. Secondly, it misunderstands dissent as 
being in opposition to the Church while a holistic conscience and communitarian approach to 
conscience sees this form of dissent as a dialogue with the Church. 
In regards to doctrinal teachings, the CDF states that should a theologian not find himself 
or herself able, after an honest and sincere attempt, to assent to a certain doctrinal teaching, then 
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“the theologian has the duty to make known to the Magisterial authorities the problems raised by 
the teaching in itself, in the arguments proposed to justify it, or even in the manner in which it is 
presented. He [or she] should do this in an evangelical spirit and with a profound desire to 
resolve the difficulties.”97 However, the theologian “should avoid turning to the ‘mass media’” 
and “nevertheless has the duty to remain open to a deeper examination of the question.”98 This is 
precisely the spirit with which Curran and the LCWR appeal towards in legitimizing their 
dissenting actions. However, the problem arises when the magisterial authorities either enter the 
dialogue with a hermeneutic of suspicion or effectively limit the dialogue to a monologue 
wherein the magisterial authority does not recognize its own duty to “remain open to a deeper 
examination of the question.” In such an instance, the Curran case has given the theological 
insights to dissent responsibly and the LCWR has actually provided a legitimate framework that 
embodies lessons from the Curran case in Sr. Pat Farrell’s presidential address, “Navigating the 
Shifts.” 
The Curran case not only provides the theological foundation for Sr. Pat Farrell’s 
address, but also provides key conditions for legitimate dissent. With Curran’s understanding of 
conscience understood to be “far from positing relativism or subjectivism, this approach affirms 
a radical identity between authentic subjectivity and objectivity.”99 This communicates the self-
transcendence of conscience as articulated by Vischer. Therefore, for dissent to be legitimately 
understood as a valid act of conscience, it must be a faithful call for dialogue over non-infallible 
teaching that strikes at the core of one’s personhood, namely freedom as fully expressed in that 
person’s intersubjective life narrative. Should that dialogue not take place, Curran justifies public 
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dissent as not just as a moral option, but as a duty of conscience for the greater good of the 
Church. 
 In her address, Sr. Pat Farrell lists six ways with which the LCWR might navigate the 
present times: contemplation, with a prophetic voice, in solidarity with the marginalized, in 
community, non-violently and with joyful hope. I argue that these six strategies compose an 
effective and moral framework for authentic dissent in the Church today. 
Contemplation 
 Sr. Pat Farrell asks: “How else can we go forward except from a place of deep prayer? 
Our vocations, our lives, begin and end in the desire for God. We have a lifetime of being lured 
into union with divine Mystery. That Presence is our truest home.”100 This sincere contemplation 
acknowledges and ensures the guidance of the Spirit and the authentic strife for the common 
good that is a turning towards God who is the fullness of all goodness. 
With a Prophetic Voice 
 Farrell states that the call of Vatican II “urged us to respond to the signs of our times” and 
that “prophecy is both God’s gift as well as the product of rigorous asceticism. Our rootedness in 
God needs to be deep enough and our read on reality clear enough for us to be a voice of 
conscience.” 101 This call for a prophetic voice is one that must be tempered with informed 
reason. Thus, it becomes the responsibility of the prophetic dissenter to be masters in the schools 
of theology and the social sciences in order to properly read the “signs of our times.” Farrell is 
clear not to conflate prophecy with arrogance. She claims that a prophetic response “would be 
humble, but not submissive; rooted in a solid sense of ourselves, but not self-righteous; truthful, 
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but gentle and absolutely fearless. It would ask probing questions.” In this manner a dissenter 
can fulfill his or her call to share “also in Christ’s prophetic office.”102 
Solidarity with the Marginalized 
 Farrell boldly claims that “we cannot live prophetically without proximity to those who 
are vulnerable and marginalized.”103 Just be fulfilling the pre-condition of dissenting over non-
infallible teaching is not alone for the authentic dissenter. He or she must also be willing to live 
in solidarity with the marginalized as an extension of conscience’s self-transcendence. This also 
takes seriously the implications of the sensus fidelium by living in solidarity with those on the 
margins of the hierarchy’s moral framework. 
In Community 
 Farrell declares of the LCWR that “we have learned a lot about creating community from 
diversity, and about celebrating differences. We have come to trust divergent opinions as 
powerful pathways to greater clarity. Our commitment to community compels us to do that, as 
together we seek the common good.”104 This characteristic is essential to the common good of 
the Church because it is precisely this element that distinguishes a responsible dissenter from a 
disenfranchised Christian who turns unto himself. A characteristic of self-transcending 
conscience is that continual giving of self towards God and not a turning into oneself away from 
one’s relationships. 
Non-violent 
 Non-violence does not just refer to physical violence, but also to “resisting rather than 
colluding with abusive power […] It refuses to shame, blame, threaten or demonize. In fact, non-
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violence requires that we befriend our own darkness and brokenness rather than projecting it 
onto another. […] It refuses to accept ultimatums and dead-end definitions without imaginative 
attempts to reframe them.”105 It is this approach that marks the transformative power of dissent 
as dialogue. Curran exemplified this when he stated in his letter to Ratzinger that “I am 
conscious of my own limitations and my own failures. I am aware of the consequences of what is 
involved […] I remain a loyal and committed Roman Catholic. I pray daily that I might continue 
to love and serve the Church without bitterness and anger. […] I believe these are all for the 
good of the Roman Catholic Church – my Church.”106 
Living in Joyful Hope 
 Farrell concluded her remarks by stating “joyful hope is the hallmark of genuine 
discipleship […] Hope makes us attentive to signs of the inbreaking of the Reign of God.”107 
This hope corresponds with the eschatological nature of the pilgrim Church. Recognizing the 
imperfection of the present Church, joyful hope allows the dissenter to move forward with 
charity and perseverance in the work of achieving the common good. It is in this spirit that the 
dissenter echoes the words of the CDF when it stated “that if the truth really is at stake, it will 
ultimately prevail.”108 It is this common spirit of joyful hope that opens the possibility for the 
Spirit to transform such tension into a moment of grace for the Church and the people of God. 
Conclusion 
 Given the present conflict between the LCWR and the Vatican hierarchy, it serves the 
discerning faithful best to view this conflict in light of the relational dimension of conscience. 
Through this lens, one can observe how the LCWR’s dissent is not a form of malicious rebellion 
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against Church hierarchy. Instead, one observes how the LCWR is exercising responsible dissent 
as an act of conscience in relationship with the Church. The LCWR’s actions are a call for open 
and honest dialogue. It would do well for the Magisterium to respond with the same openness 
and good-will as it expects of its theologians. 
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Conclusion 
 In the first chapter I explored the deeper questions being raised from the present LCWR 
case. Although at surface level, the temptation is to view these types of conflicts with a binary 
lens of right and wrong, it neither serves the Church nor the people of God to diminish the 
richness of the present dynamic. What actually is occurring is a case of two divergent claims 
over how truth manifests itself in the practical dimensions of people’s lives. The dispute is over 
the pragmatic application of truth in the discernment of conscience and what its implications are 
for the truth itself. Thus, the question became an investigation into methodology and theological 
anthropology: What exactly is the relationship between truth and reason in the discernment of 
conscience? The second question stems out of the first question: What exactly is the Church’s 
role in mediating this discernment process? 
 The second chapter provided greater insight as to how one might answer such questions 
in the light of a holistic approach to conscience. Using the case study of Charles Curran’s 
controversy with the Vatican, I formulated that dissent can be a positive force in the larger 
dynamic of one’s assent to Church teachings. When one cannot assent to a non-infallible 
teaching but accepts the foundational dogmatic truths of the Roman Catholic Church, one can 
and must dialogue about the situation as a matter of conscience. 
 It was discovered in this chapter that the point of departure between Curran and the 
hierarchical Church is the formal understanding of conscience and its proper discernment. While 
the Church traditionally favors a deontological approach to conscience wherein objective truths 
of received Gospel teachings are interpreted solely by the Magisterium and require the assent of 
the faithful, more progressive thinkers who take seriously modernity’s turn to the subject place 
greater weight on the subjective dimension of conscience. Curran claims that a holistic 
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conscience is a convergence of the subjective and objective poles within the human person. 
Under this model, the affective dimensions of the subjective pole – reason, grace, emotions, and 
intuition – signal an interdependent characteristic of conscience that is a composition of one’s 
human experiences. 
 The third chapter, after deconstructing both the LCWR case and the Curran case, 
attempted to construct a moral framework for understanding dissent as a legitimate act of 
conscience in a Roman Catholic context. This required the use of Vischer’s articulation of 
conscience’s relational dimension. Through Vischer’s hermeneutic, conscience is understood as 
an ever-dynamic faculty of the human person to discern how one might transcend oneself in light 
of one’s life narrative that is shaped through one’s relationships. The implications of such an 
understanding are broad and deep, but for the purpose of understanding dissent I focused on how 
a context-specific discernment of conscience justifies dissent as an authentic expression of one’s 
personhood in relationship with, not in opposition to, the Church.  
 In this light, the Church maintains a responsibility to acknowledge seriously the 
dissenting conscience out of respect for the dignity of the human person expressing her authentic 
self. Thus, in the service of conscience, the Church bears the responsibility of neither stifling 
conscience nor dictating it with a blanket objective truth without any regard for the 
circumstances which define a person’s life narrative. The hierarchical Church can best do this by 
modeling itself as a venue for what Vischer calls a “moral marketplace” wherein the sensus 
fidelium might have an inclusive invitation to dialogue with the Church. Fears of moral 
relativism or challenges to the Church’s teaching authority might be reduced if the Church is 
given an avenue to make a distinction between a dissenter’s access to theological discourse and 
promotion of doctrinal teaching. In this way, mutual acknowledgment and respect for the 
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Church’s teaching authority and the dissenter’s conscience are shared in a dialogical ecclesial 
communion. 
 Given this renewed understanding of conscience and dissent, the LCWR is found to be 
righteous in their stated approach found in Farrell’s presidential address. The six-part framework 
is a model for all the faithful who, after a sincere attempt to assent to Church teaching, finds 
themselves being untrue to their life narratives. In contemplation, with a prophetic voice, through 
solidarity with the marginalized, in community, non-violently, and in joyful hope can all 
dissenters be true prophetic voices working towards the common good in a pilgrim Church ever-
striving for that perfection in Christ. 
 
 
